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ABSTRACT 
British Columbia's forest tenure system has shaped the development of 
the provinces forest products industry for over 100 years. As the industry 
continues to face serious decline in its global competitive position, calls for 
significant tenure reform are increasing. Corporatization , privatization and 
decentralization have been presented in the literature as tenure reform options 
available to the government of British Columbia. 
This report examines the literature on the history of tenure reform and the 
relevant strategic literature to prepare an analytical strategic approach to 
examine the affects of these three tenure reform options on BC's competitive 
position, using the five forces model. The analysis demonstrates that each of the 
tenure reforms can have a range of positive and negative effects on the 
industry's competitive position. This highlights the critical importance of a 
thorough understanding of the affects of tenure reform and how it can influence 
the forest industry's competitiveness. 
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The structure and performance of BC's forest products industry is closely 
linked to the provinces forest tenure system, through which timber harvesting 
rights and responsibilities are allocated . The basic construct of today's system 
was designed in mid-1940, and since then the system has undergone a myriad of 
changes, designed to achieve a diversity of objectives, which has resulted in one 
of Canada's most complex systems. 
As the competitiveness of the BC forest products industry continues to 
decline, there are growing concerns about the ability of the tenure system to 
support a globally competitive forest industry. Over the past decade provincial 
governments have initiated five separate forest industry competitiveness 
initiatives and each has highlighted the importance of tenure reform as a means 
of revitalizing the industry. But despite the many recommendations and the few 
reforms that have occurred, the industry's competitive position continues to 
decline and is becoming critical in some sectors. Given the powerful nature of 
this public policy instrument the provincial government must carefully consider 
future tenure reforms and the possible implications to industry competitiveness. 
The purpose of this project is to prepare an analytical strategic approach 
to comparing three uniquely different tenure reform options, as described by 
Haley and Nelson (2006) to determine how each will potentially affect the global 
competitive forces currently shaping the industry, using the five forces model 
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(Porter 1985). By considering these effects, we are able to examine the potential 
implications of tenure reform options on the forest industry's competitive position. 
This project will not consider the legal , social and environmental effects of tenure 
reform, or the means to implement them. 
Methodology 
In this project the methodology used was to review the literature and 
gather the required information to respond with confidence to the research 
question. This consisted of a review of the literature concerning the history of 
forest tenure and forest tenure reform in British Columbia, a literature review of 
the five forces model , the dominant approaches to strategy, including industry 
positioning , resources based view, sustainable competitive advantage, national 
advantage, environmental scanning, and a review of current forest tenures and 
the three tenure reform options; corporatization , privatization and 
decentralization . 
The information collected from the reviews was then used to prepare the 
current competitive position of the BC forest products industry, and to prepare a 
macro-level environmental scan of the factors influencing the industry. These 
results were then analyzed to determine the possible effects of the three tenure 
reform options on the industry's current competitive position , as described by the 
five forces model. While strictly qualitative, the analysis concludes that tenure 
reform can affect industry structure, and that each option considered will have 
unique effects. It will be important for the provincial government to understand 




Historical Overview of Forest Tenures in British Columbia 
The term "tenure" comes from English feudal ism and is derived from a 
Latin term for "holding" or "possessing". The notion of tenure is based in Anglo-
Canadian law, where absolute rights to all land area are vested in the Crown, 
which in turn grants certain rights to private individuals. Overall , a tenure system 
is typically a reflection of the economic, political and social systems, which 
produce and influence it (Bruce 1998). Vertinsky (2007) describes a forest 
tenure system as one that provides property rights for the holder, but within a 
context of social conditions, which governments place on the holder. Cashore et 
al. (2001) further describe this as part of a policy regime, which reflects a set of 
norms, conventions , rules and behaviours, which are designed to influence ones 
actions in an attempt to achieve a set of provincial level goals and objectives. 
Historically, the BC government's primary goal for the provincial forest 
tenure system was to provide access to timber to establish and grow a 
competitive forest industry, which would provide jobs in communities throughout 
the province and a source of revenue for the crown (Sloan 1957, Task Force on 
Crown Timber Disposal1974 and Pearse 1976). Table 1 provides a summary of 
the major events, which reformed tenure policy in British Columbia. 
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Table 1: Summary of Major Forest Tenure Policy Events in British Columbia 
Source: BC Ministry of Forests and Lands 
1865 The Land Ordinance grants licenses to harvest timber while the 
Crown retains ownership in the land, and formalized in the Land 
Act of 1884. 
1888 Timber licenses are granted for a one-year term and limited to 
1000 acres. 
1905 Terms for timber licenses changed to allow for replacement and 
are transferable. 
1907 Granting of timber licenses are suspended. 
1909 Royal Commission of Inquiry established, F.J. Fulton appointed as 
Commissioner. 
1912 Forest Act established, which creates a Forest Service to manage 
reserve lands and issue short-term licenses. 
1943 Royal Commission of Inquiry established, Chief Justice Gordon 
Sloan appointed. 
1947 Forest Act changes tenure arrangements and establish 
management units from new volume based licenses . 
1956 Second Royal Commission of Inquiry, lead by Chief Justice Sloan. 
1975 Royal Commission of Inquiry established, Dr P. Pearse appointed 
as Commissioner. 
1978 Forest Act establishes Timber Supply Areas and new form of 
~olume-based tenures. 
1981 Small Business Forest Enterprise Program (SBFEP) introduced to 
encourage competitive market for timber sales. 
1988 Government implements a 5% take-back of replaceable timber 
rights, and allocates a portion to the SBFEP. 
1991 Forest Resources Commission established, which makes 
recommendations for tenure reform. 
~003 Government's Forest Revitalization Plan makes a series of tenure 
policy changes 
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Early Provincial Forest Policies 
Prior to joining the Confederation of Canada, the British colonies of 
Vancouver Island and British Columbia transferred timber rights from Crown land 
using grants of fee simple interest in the land. James Douglas, the Colonial 
Governor of the two colonies at the time, introduced the idea of granting property 
rights to harvest Crown timber, but without alienating the land itself (Task Force 
1974). His approach was the foundation for the creation of the timber lease, 
which as reflected in the Land Ordinance of 1865. The timber lease allowed 
government to provide access to provincial timber for industrial development and 
retain ownership of the land (Wilson et al. 1998). 
Between 1871 and 1911 the population of BC increased by 700% and the 
forest industry became the dominant sector in the economy. Sawmills increased 
from 27 to 224, and employment went from 393 to 15,400 (Marchak 1983). With 
this industrial expansion, the provincial government began to recognize that 
timber had a great value as a source of industrial and community development, 
and a source of provincial revenue (Kant et al. 2002). 
The 1910 Royal Commission of Inquiry on Timber and Forestry 
In 1909, and continued pressure from the forest sector to issue more 
licenses, the Premier, Sir Richard McBride called for the establishment of a 
Royal Commission of Inquiry. He appointed the Hon. Fred J. Fulton, who was 
acting Attorney General at the time, as the Commissioner. Fulton was 
mandated to reassess the provinces forest tenure policy and to explore how 
B.C.'s forests could best be managed. 
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The Commissioner's 1910 report recommended that government continue 
to grant access to timber while retaining Crown ownership of the lands. He 
stated that the " ... abandonment of the practice of Crown granting timber land 
and the adoption of a leasing system marked an important step forward in the 
provincial policy. That the change originated in the desire of the Legislature to 
encourage the establishment of sawmills is made very evident by the Act of 1888 
that made the building of a mill an essential condition of every lease." (Fulton 
1910, 16). Fulton also characterized the early tenure system as one designed 
primarily to provide " ... sawmill owners with a definite source of supply, at cheap 
rates" (Fulton 1910, 6). 
Following the recommendations of the Fulton report the provincial 
government established forest reserves due to the perspective that much of the 
available forest had already been alienated through existing tenure 
arrangements, and that no further alienations could take place except in very 
special circumstance (Task Force 1974). The government also established 
competitive auctions of prescribed tracts of land within the reserves, which later 
became known as the timber sale license (Task Force 1974). 
With the establishment of the Forest Act of 1912 the province secured 
control over the granting of timber harvesting rights and established the ability to 
implement a regime of charges, fees and royalties, from which the province 
would draw revenues over time. With B.C.'s substantial timber inventory, 
declining supplies in the U.S., and emerging forest products markets, the value of 
B.C.'s forests was destined to rise (Fulton 191 0). 
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The 1945 and 1956 Public Inquiries into the Forest Resources of BC 
Demand for B.C lumber increased rapidly after WWI , as the newly opened 
Panama Canal made eastern U.S. and European markets much more 
accessible, and there were also apprehensions about the future supplies of 
timber in the U.S. The B.C. forest industry began to experience a period of 
prosperity together with a general economic expansion in the province. Pulp and 
paper mills were now being established along BC's coast, which became 
integrated with existing sawmill operations (Marchak 1983). 
As BC's forest products industry grew, becoming a larger part of the BC 
economy, there was also a growing dependence by its employees, communities 
and the provincial government (Nicol et al. 2006). Given this dependence, the 
provincial government began to realize that there were no assurances of 
continuous forest production (Pearse. 1976). By 1940, 2858 forest companies 
had tenure , and 58 of those controlled 52% of the forest tenure in the province. 
Timber sale licenses were also becoming clustered around the coast and 
developed areas and there was a growing concern about the lack of reforestation 
on these licenses (Marchak 1983). The forest industry was also voicing 
concerns about the short-term nature of the tenure system and that the current 
system was not providing adequate assurance of long-term supply to justify 
industrial expansion (Task Force 1974). 
By 1943, concerns about the tenure system and the increasing 
competition by firms in Scandinavia and the Baltic nations lead the provincial 
government to initiate a Public Inquiry into the Forest Resources of British 
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Columbia. Premier John Hart appointed Chief Justice Gordon Sloan as the 
Commissioner, with the mandate to enquire into the state of the industry, with the 
stated purpose of finding ways to protect the industry (Task Force 197 4, Pearse 
1976 and Marchak 1983). 
In his report, Chief Justice Sloan made recommendations in three key 
areas. These included: the idea that more secure tenure arrangements would 
provide incentives to undertake improved forest management; that sustained 
yield policy would ensure community stability; and that security of tenure would 
attract investment for the construction and maintenance of sawmills that would 
spur employment. He also recommended that tenures be awarded to the pulp 
and paper industries and other large integrated organizations because these 
firms were likely to be "more stable" (Sloan 1957, 94 ). 
Sloan (1945) recommended a restructuring of the tenure system, which 
included what eventually became known as Public Sustained Yield Units (PSYU) 
and Tree Farm Licenses {TFL). This new system was designed to provide long-
term security for the industry to encourage investment, promote improved forest 
management by introducing sustained yield forestry, and provide community 
stability (Wilson et al. 1998, Dellert 1998 and Nicol et al. 2006). The provincial 
government adopted the Commission's recommendations in legislation in 1948 
(Kant et al. 2002). 
Prior to this public inquiry the timber harvest had risen modestly, with a 
predictable decline during the war years. But in the decade following the 1945 
Sloan Commission, the volume of timber cut in the province doubled, (BC MF&R, 
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1945 and 1955) with the majority of the increase coming from the growing forest 
industry in the interior of the province (Pedersen 2003). A second Public Inquiry 
headed by Gordon Sloan in 1955 evaluated the implementation of the new forest 
policy direction and recommended its continuation and expansion. 
In his 1956 report, Chief Justice Sloan stated that: "An assured continuity 
of supply of raw material results in the construction, maintenance, and 
uninterrupted operation of costly integrated conversion plants, ensuring the 
highest utilization return for the logs cut with attendant competitive advantages in 
world markets. This in turn should result in a maximum continuity of employment 
in all phases of the industry ... " He also stated : "Continuity of employment has, as 
its sequel stable, settled, and prosperous communities ... " (Sloan 1957,43). 
Following the second Sloan Commission, pulp mills began to expand into 
the B.C. interior. Between 1963 and 197 4, 10 new mills were added to the 
existing 14, and the new mills needed large continuous supplies of wood chips. 
In response the provincial government provided new long-term tenures through 
the establishment of Pulpwood Harvesting Agreements (Task Force 1974). 
Supplies were also being secured through the takeover of sawmills, to obtain 
their harvesting rights and to reduce competition for the resource. The total 
number of sawmills in the province dropped from over 2000 in the 1950's to 330 
by 1978 (Marchak 1983). During this time the provincial government was also 
involved in major infrastructure and transportation development to support the 
industry and communities grew to provide labour (Pedersen 2003). 
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The net effect of the tenure policy changes and in direct response to the 
growing U.S. demand for forest products, the BC forest industry continued to 
develop and expand , which provided the impetus for the population growth, 
business and transportation infrastructure development for much of the province 
(Marchak 1983, Pedersen 2003 and Nicol et al. 2006). By the early 70's there 
was also a shift towards enhanced environmental values on public forestlands 
(Cashore et al. 2001 ). 
The 1975 Royal Commission on Forest Resources 
In 1975, the dramatic change in the size, structure and technology in the 
forest industry lead to the establishment of the Royal Commission on Forest 
Resources, and Dr. Peter H. Pearse was appointed commissioner. His primary 
task was to broadly examine and make recommendations to change forest 
policy. The Commission analyzed what Pearse characterized as a "somewhat 
bewildering mixture of rights" (Pearse 1976, 22) that had developed over the past 
century, as successive governments added new forms of property rights to the 
existing forms of tenure. 
In his 1976 report, Pearse commented on the industry's declining 
profitability and suggested that the industry was facing obstacles to further 
growth. The industry's traditional advantage of superior timber was eroding and 
its costs were high relative to other competitors. He felt that government had a 
role in helping the industry reduce its costs by removing regulations and policies, 
which were considered excessive or demanded standards that were 
unnecessary. He also saw an opportunity for government to enhance the market 
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value of logs and intermediate forest products such as chips. Pearse also 
recommended that forest policy not favour only the larger firms in order that 
government restore a more balanced and diverse industrial sector. 
The 1978 Forest Act was amended to encourage more capital investment 
in the industry through increased security and to improve government flexibility to 
regulate (Wilson et al. 1998). The amendments incorporated many of Pearse's 
recommendations, which provide the statutory framework for tenure holders 
today. Area-based Tree Farm Licenses became the primary form of tenure, most 
of which were granted by 1966 (Pearse 1976), and a new form of volume-based 
tenure, the Forest License, was also created , which granted harvesting rights 
within a Timber Supply Area. Today, Tree Farm Licenses and Forest Licenses 
account for over 80% of the allocated cut in B.C. (BC Ministry of Forest &Range 
2006b). 
The tenure structure was further modified with the 1978 introduction of the 
Small Business Forest Enterprise Program (SBFEP). The SBFEP was a policy 
response to concerns about the sector concentration and barriers to entry, which 
were in part developed by the government to provide security of supply to attract 
investment (Wilson et al. 1998). 
The historical significance of the 1976 Royal Commission was in its 
attempt to unravel the many layers of forest tenures and policies laid down by 
previous governments who were working to improve the economic efficiency of 
the forest industry (Gray 1977). Many authors have debated the significance of 
the tenure changes made as a result of Commissioner's recommendations, 
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suggesting that 1976 Royal Commission did not call for a major red irection of 
forest policy, but rather acted to legitimize and entrench the concentrations of 
harvesting rights , which in large part were induced by previous policies (Cashore 
et al. 2001 ,1 05). 
Recent Trends in Forest Tenure Reform 
Throughout the 1980's as environmental concerns continued to escalate, 
changes to provincial forest policies were focused mainly on attempting to 
achieve the integrated use of multiple values on public forestlands (Cashore et 
al. 2001 and Haley et al. 2006). In response to the recession in the early 1980's 
the forest industry began to focus on productivity improvements through the 
incorporation of new technologies (Nicol et al. 2006). As pressure continued to 
mount to stay competitive, the industry began to rationalize facilities employing 
fewer people (Cashore et al. 2001 and Nicol et al. 2006). By the mid-'80's the 
industry also dramatically increased it's penetration into the US market and came 
under pressure from US producers for alleged unfair competition. In addition , the 
forest industry was coming under increasing criticism for its forestry practices and 
preservationists began to win victories through logging blockades and 
international market campaigns (Cashore et al. 2001 ). But despite these issues 
the total value of forest products shipped by the province increased from $4 
billion to $15.5 billion between 1976 and 2003 (BC Ministry of Forests & Range 
1976 and Council of Forest Industries 2008). Stumpage and other fees paid by 
the industry also increased from $66,564,000 to $986,495,000 during this same 
period (BC Ministry of Forests &Range, 1976 and 2003). 
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The overall strategic direction of the forest industry was characterized by a 
growing concentration and centralization of ownership, increasing economy of 
scale in manufacturing operations, improved technology to reduce cost and 
improve quality, and further expansion of the pulp and paper sector in the 
interior. Throughout this period the industry became well known for its strategic 
approach , which was based on cost leadership and efficiency (Wouters 2000). 
In 1989, the provincial government announced the establishment of a 
Forest Resources Commission to independently review and make 
recommendations on how to manage and protect the full range of forest values 
(Haley et al. 1992). In response, and as the environmental movement grew, 
provincial policies such as the Old Growth Strategy and a doubling of protected 
areas were implemented , in an attempt to improve the provinces environmental 
image. But despite the provinces changing policy objectives and the increasing 
complexity of its forest policy regime, the tenure system continued to promote a 
sustained timber harvest, which continued to direct log flows to appurtenant 
manufacturing facilities , promoting community stability (Haley et al. 2006 and 
Nicol et al. 2006). 
By the 1990's however, the forest industry was beginning to show signs of 
distress. Increased global competition , severe market cycles in commodity forest 
products, US trade actions on softwood lumber imports, product substitution, and 
an aging manufacturing infrastructure were some of the symptoms of an industry 
that was beginning to lose its competitive edge (Roberts 2004 and Kozak et al. 
2005 and BC Competition Council , 2006). Between 1997 and 2003, 27 mills 
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closed permanently, and 13,000 forest workers lost their jobs (Forest 
Revitalization Plan 2003). Between 1998 and 2003, major corporations in BC 
forest products industry ranked in the bottom quartile for return on capital 
employed. The industry's return on capital during this time was also below its 
cost of capital , which discouraged capital expenditure (Roberts et al. 2004). 
In 2003, the provincial government enacted the Forestry Revitalization 
Act, in an attempt to revitalize the industry. Under the Act, the provincial 
government took back approximately 20% of the forest industry's replaceable 
forest tenures, which it re-allocated to the BC Timber Sales program and to other 
new participants such as First Nations communities (Nicol 2006 and Nelson 
2006). The primary role of the BC Timber Sales program is to competitively 
auction 20% of the province's crown timber creating a competitive timber market 
(Forest Revitalization Plan 2003). In addition to the re-allocation of tenure, 
changes were made to tenure policy to reduce cut control requirements and 
remove processing requirements. Restrictions to transferring and subdividing 
tenures were also removed (Nelson et al. 2006). 
Likely the most dominant issue that has emerged over the past decade is 
the issue of Aboriginal rights and title, which involves the direct control over land 
ownership in B.C. The question of who owns the land is fundamental when 
considering forest policy change (Cashore et al. 2006). 
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Current Forest Tenures in British Columbia 
Today, the BC Ministry of Forests and Range define the provinces forest 
tenure system as the collection of legislation, regulations, contractual 
agreements, permits and government policies that define and constrain a 
person's right to harvest the provinces timber (BC MF&L, 2006b). 
There are two general types of forest tenures in B.C today: long-term 
tenures and short-term licenses. Long-term tenures are the Tree Farm License 
and the Forest License under which the provincial government has transferred 
long-term timber harvesting rights and the delegation of significant forest 
management responsibilities to the tenure holder. In the case of the Tree Farm 
License, the tenure holder has the exclusive right to harvest from a specified 
area, whereas a Forest License holder has the right to harvest within a specified 
Timber Supply Area where numerous other tenure holders also have harvesting 
rights. In both cases, their activities are subject to the terms and conditions of 
the Forest Act and the Forest and Range Practices Act (BC Ministry of Forests 
and Range, 2006b). Short-term licenses generally allocate harvesting rights 
over a shorter period and typically have fewer forest-management responsibilities 
as long-term tenures. (Haley et al.1990). 



















Table 2: Overview of Major Forest Tenures in British Columbia 
Source: Adopted from BC Ministry of Forests and Range 2006b. 
Overview of Major Forest Tenures In British Columbia 
Area or Property Rights Duration Major Responsibilities 
Volume 
Area Exclusive right to harvest ~ariable terms, Planning, road building, 
~mber in a specified area. no longer being reforestation, stumpage fees. 
issued. 
Area Virtually exclusive right to 25 year term, Planning, inventories, roads 
harvest and mange timber in replaceable every building , reforestation , stumpage 
a specified area. May also 5- 10 years. fees, logging contractor obligations. 
include private land. 
Volume Right to harvest an allowable 20 year term, Planning, road building, 
annual cut in a specified replaceable every reforestation, stumpage fees, 
management unit. 5- 10 years, or logging contractor obligations. 
non-replaceable. 
Volume Grants a conditional right to 25 year term, no Planning, appurtenancy, obligation 
harvest pulp quality timber, longer being to purchase wood residue, 
where other sources are issued. reforestation and stumpage fees. 
insufficient or uneconomic. 
!Volume or Issued by BC Timber Sales Up to a 4 year Planning in limited cases, stumpage 
!Area. Program via competitive bid. erm,non fees. 
Right to harvest a specified replaceable. 
~olume in a specified area. 
Area Exclusive right to harvest Up to 20 years. Planning, inventories, road building, 
timber in a specified area. Most are reforestation, stumpage fees. 
May include private land. replaceable every 
10 years. 
~ea Exclusive right to harvest Initially 5 year Planning, inventories, road building, 
timber in a specified area. agreements, can reforestation, stumpage fees. 
May also include right to be converted into 
harvest and charge fees for long term 
non timber forest products. replaceable 
licenses. 
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Tenure Reform Options 
The structure of the forest industry in British Columbia is closely linked 
with the provinces forest tenure system (Maness 2006). Many concerns raised 
about the existing tenure system in British Columbia suggest that the system 
may be contributing to the industry's current competitive disadvantage, and the 
system no longer provides the economic and social benefits expected by the 
provincial government (Haley 2007). In fact, the same can be said about many 
of the tenures systems in the rest of Canada. Several provinces have initiated 
task forces to assess the problems facing the forest industry, and each has 
highlighted the need for forest tenure reform, as an important component for 
forest sector restructuring (BC Competition Council 2006, Alberta Forest Industry 
Competitiveness Project 2006, Ontario Minister's Council on Forest Industry 
Competition 2005 and Forests: Building a Future for Quebec 2007). 
British Columbia, and indeed Canada have been endowed with a rich 
natural timber resource . This important factor condition , along with available 
labour and the close proximity to the dominant U.S. market, allowed this region 
and nation to become the leading low cost producers of commodity forest 
products. Unfortunately, this rich endowment and favoured status relative to the 
U.S market has eroded (Porter 1991 and Martin and Porter 2001). Martin and 
Porter (2001) discussed the need for Canada to abandon its comfortable path for 
a new one, based on "innovation and bold strategy" (p. 26). 
Many authors discuss the important role of forest tenure and tenure 
reform, to stimulate innovation and this new bold strategy (Nelson et al. 2006, 
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Maness 2006, Kozak et al. 2005, Nicol et al. and Cashore et al. 2006 and Haley 
et al. 2006). Haley and Nelson (2006) present three alternative options for tenure 
reform in British Columbia. Though not strictly adhered to, these alternatives 
have guided the following contents of this project. From a regional context, the 
authors also describe tenure reform at three levels: 
1. Retain the basic structure of the current tenure system, but change 
contractual obligations to address specific areas of concern 
2. Retain many features of the existing tenure system, but introduce 
significant changes such as a reallocation of existing rights, 
3. Discard the existing tenure system, in whole or part and replace it 
with an alternative arrangement for allocating rights to harvest 
public timber. 
For the purposes of this project, the level of tenure reform considered is to 
discard the existing tenure system and replace it entirely with one of the three 
alternative tenure options proposed by Haley and Nelson (2006); corporatization , 
privatization, and decentralization. 
Corporatization 
Corporatization involves creating a Crown corporation that would manage 
the provincial forestlands of British Columbia, on behalf of the provincial 
government. The corporation 's mandate would include maximizing profits from 
timber harvesting and other land management activities, while meeting 
environmental and social objectives set by government. Being at arms length 
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from government, the corporation would require its own business systems, staff, 
and access to capital resources. Forest companies would purchase timber from 
the corporation through a competitive bidding process, creating a competitive log 
market. 
Privatization 
This second approach involves selling British Columbia's provincial 
forestlands to private interests, and giving up the regulatory controls of the 
current forest policy regime. Options range from selling the land with all of the 
forest attributes associated to only selling the timber rights and retaining the 
ownership of the land. There are also a variety of options available in terms of 
the degree to which controls are relinquished , ranging from retaining minimal 
regulatory controls to retaining extensive regulatory controls. For the purposes of 
the following analysis, the privatization model assumes the sale of British 
Columbia's public forests to private interests, but the provincial government will 
retain ownership in the land. This model also assumes that in doing so, the 
provincial government will give up some of the regulatory controls of the current 
~orest policy regime, but retain enough to continue to achieve the environmental 
and social objectives of the crown. 
Decentralization 
This third approach involves the relocation of forest management 
decision-making authority away from the provincial authority to a regional level 
authority, such as a regionally elected management board . Boards would have 
the freedom to maximize benefits from the regional forests , through the sale of 
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timber and non-timber products, within the constraints of a set of environmental 
and social objectives provided by the provincial government. The regional 
boards would also be responsible for most of the forest management activities. 
The provincial government could also retain a certain level of regulatory control 
over the public forestlands, such as specifying the maximum allowable annual 
cut available within the regional forest. 
Haley and Nelson (2006) also suggest that a tenure system designed to 
promote industrial competitiveness, social stability and environmental stability 
should have the following attributes: social legitimacy, flexibility, transparency, 
security, diversity, minimum regulatory compliance costs and efficient equitable 
timber pricing. For the purposes of results and analysis of this paper, a subset 
has been chosen that reflects the desirable attributes from the firm's perspective. 
The attributes are: security of timber supply, total cost of timber supply, and 
flexibility of timber supply. 
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Competitive Forces 
Porter (2008) describes the role of the strategist as someone who must 
understand and cope with competition . To understand competition within an 
industry, Porter (1985) proposes an analytical framework, which considers the 
industry's structure and the forces that shape competitiveness. Understanding 
the forces and their underlying causes will reveal industry profitabil ity, which he 
uses as the measure for industry attractiveness (Figure 1 ). 









Source: Adopted from Porter (1985) 
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Barriers to entry describe the structural advantages that existing firms 
have over new entrants, which may deter their entry into the business. The 
major barriers to entry include: economies of scale, network effects, customer 
switching costs, capital requirements, incumbency advantages independent of 
size, unequal access to distribution channels, and restrictive government policy. 
Without such barriers, new entrants can bring new capacity in attempts to gain 
market share putting downward pressure on prices. When barriers are low, firms 
in the existing industry must hold down prices or boost investment to lower costs 
in attempts to deter new entrants. 
Powerful buyers can capture more value by forcing down prices or 
increase industry costs by demanding better quality and more service. The 
bargaining power of buyers is higher when there are few buyers who purchase 
large quantities, industry products are undifferentiated, and buyers can backward 
integrate. When buyer power is high , firms attempt to leverage their own position 
by establishing exclusive arrangements with particular customers . 
Substitute products and services attempt to offer similar function but by a 
different means, resulting in a greater perceived value to customers. The threat 
is high when : substitutes offer an attractive price-performance trade-off to the 
industry's products, or the buyer's costs of switching to the substitute are low. 
This results in reduced industry profitability during normal times and the 
establishment of a price ceiling, limiting profits in good times. Industries with a 
high threat of substitution must continually focus on keeping costs low and prices 
down. 
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Powerful suppliers attempt to capture more value by charging higher 
prices or by limiting quality and service to the industry, resulting in higher costs. 
Supplier power is higher when suppliers are more concentrated than the industry, 
switching costs are high, supply is differentiated or has no substitute, and 
suppliers can forward integrate. In response, industry can attempt to concentrate 
its purchases with other buyers or backward integrate, if feasible. 
Competitor rivalry is considered high when there are large numbers of 
competitors with similar capacity, slow or stagnant industry growth, high exit 
barriers, low product differentiation or brand equity, and high fixed costs. In 
response to high rivalry, firms attempt to aggressively compete by changing 
prices, improving products and distribution channels , and exploiting relationships 
with suppliers. 
The five forces model provides the baseline for beginning to size up the 
firm's strengths and weaknesses relative to the rest of the industry, allowing it to 
derive defensive and offensive actions to cope successfully with the most 
significant aspects of the competitive environment. The forces also provide a 
framework for anticipating and influencing competition within the industry. From 
this position, the firm can then begin to develop its competitive strategy (Porter, 
2008). Porter also cautions that by reacting to the competitiveness with 
changes to its activities will also likely elicit a reaction by rivals. Active 
competitors to the industry will also be responding to signals from the competitive 
environment. As a result, the search for a sustainable competitive advantage 
is one that requires the continuous evaluation of potential benefits and risks of 
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competitive strategy. Industry growth, innovation , government policies, and 
complementary products all affect industry structure, which will also affect 
competitiveness. For example, fast growing industries will not always be fast 
growing and government policies can influence either of the competitive forces 
(Porter, 2008). 
Adam Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff suggested a further refinement 
to Porter's five forces framework by adding a sixth force, which they termed 
complementors (Ghemawat 2002). This force included suppliers and customers 
who formed strategic alliances as observed in the technology sector. Other 
critics of Porter's five forces include Coyne and Subramanian (1996). They were 
sceptical about three assumptions, which they said had to underlie the forces in 
order for Porter's model to work. The assumptions they highlighted were: no 
interaction or collusion between buyers and suppliers and other competitors, that 
competitive advantage is structural , and that uncertainty is low allowing firms 
time to plan and respond to the forces. 
Strategy 
Strategy, from the ancient Greek word 'strategia ', comes from roots 
meaning "army" and "to lead" (Merriam-Webster). Originally, strategy has 
involved the planning and directing of an organization toward a set of goals and 
objectives (Collis et al. 2005). The contemporary literature defines two dominant 
approaches to strategy. Porter (1985) supports the notion that firms strive to 
occupy a sustainable strategic position within their industries, which results in 
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above average profits and market share. Porter's (1985) view is underpinned 
by what he terms the activity-based view of the firm , suggesting that it is the 
activities of the firm , which are strictly aligned with its strategy that generate its 
competitive advantage. Porter also claims that competencies are an intrinsic part 
of these activities and acknowledges the inseparable nature of activities, 
resources and capabilities, but highlights that activities are paramount, because 
that is how resources are strategically allocated. 
Barney (1991) describes a second approach termed the resource-based 
view, which centers on how firms leverage their resources to gain a sustainable 
competitive advantage. This view is contrasted with Porter's. Porter focuses on 
isolating opportunities and threats outside a firm and within a company's 
competitive environment where Barney focuses on competitive advantage within 
the firm. Porter (1996) has more of the view that resources by themselves do not 
create value, but it is how you use them in particular markets that creates the 
advantage. 
Barney (1991) points out that the resourced-based view of the firm 
assumes that firms in the same industry have bundles of resources that they 
control which are heterogeneous. This heterogeneity also persists over time 
because the resources are not perfectly mobile across firms. This immobility 
becomes a necessary condition for a resource bundle to contribute to competitive 
advantage. In this way, the resource-based view suggests that a competitive 
advantage can only be developed when the firm possesses resources and 
capabilities that are uniquely superior to competitors. To become a source of 
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competitive advantage Barney ( 1991) characterizes bundles of resources as 
having to be valuable, rare , imperfectly imitable, not have strategically equivalent 
substitutes and be valuable to customers. Without these, competitor firms can 
duplicate and the advantage quickly vanishes (Dierickx et al. 1989). Barney 
(1991) also suggested that simply exploiting advantageous resources is likely not 
enough to achieve competitive advantage. 
The resource-based view also has its critics such as Mintzberg and 
Lampel (1999) who found the model to be too much inward looking for the 
difference of competitive strategy, which they felt should also be externally 
focused . 
Amit et al. (2003) also suggests that the resources themselves do not 
confer a sustainable competitive advantage. The resources only become an 
advantage when they are applied to an industry or brought to market. As a 
result, the role of management becomes crucial to convert resources into value 
for customers and delivering this to the marketplace. This suggests that good 
quality management is in itself, a potential source of sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
Mintzberg (1978) demonstrated that the notion of strategy, as deliberate 
plans conceived in advance of making specific decisions was not always true. He 
contended that strategy formation may be intended or just realized despite best 
intentions. Mintzberg contends that it is the interplay between intended and 
realized strategies that leads to the complexity of the strategy process. He 
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concluded that strategy is not a fixed plan, nor does it change systematically at 
prearranged times solely at the will of management. 
Quinn (1981) suggests that successful strategy emerges over time. He 
states that at the beginning of the strategy building process it is impossible to 
predict all the forces that will face the firm . As a result, top management can only 
forecast what is most likely to affect their company. In developing the strategy, 
the firm then attempts to build up resources and a dominant position in selected 
market so they can survive even under very difficult circumstances. Quinn also 
suggests that top management must be able to handle ambiguity while 
constantly scanning the environment for changes that will affect company 
performance. Quinn emphasizes that strategy is continually emerging and 
adjusting to outside influences and no matter how formalized, it can never be 
completely implemented due to external influences that were not anticipated by 
the management. 
Quinn also recommends outsourcing to firms that have greater 
competency in certain areas than the firm (Quinn 2004 ). Firms can then 
leverage the strengths of suppliers to gain a competitive advantage. Quinn also 
suggests that firms should be constantly scanning the environment for 
outsourcing opportunities, which will result in savings to the company. This 
model of competitive strategy differs from Porter's (1985) view, which looks for 
ways to integrate the value chain as much as possible, where as Quinn suggests 
keeping core strengths and everything else should be outsourced to create a 
competitive advantage. Quinn (1996) also suggests that outsourcing will allow 
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firms to serve customers substantially better, simultaneously decreasing risk to 
the firm and its size, while increasing flexibility. 
Sustainable Competitive Strategy 
Barney defines sustainable competitive advantage as: "A firm is said to 
have a sustained competitive advantage when it is implementing a value creating 
strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential 
competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of 
this strategy" (Barney 1991 , 1 02). 
Barney ( 1991) suggests that not all firms have the resources with the 
potential to create a sustainable competitive advantage, unless they possess four 
key attributes: rareness, value, inability to be imitated , and inability to be 
substituted, in order to have the competitive advantage potential. As a result a 
sustained advantage comes from the resources being heterogeneous in nature 
and not perfectly moveable, without great effort. 
Hunt and Morgan (1995) proposed that resources should be categorized 
as financial , physical , legal , human, organizational , informational and relational. 
It is then the combination of these resources and skills into core competencies, 
which a firm then can do uniquely well in relation to its competitors (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990). Day and Wensley (1988) identified the key sources of 
competitive advantage as superior skills of the personnel of a firm, and the 
superior resources of the firm. Combining resources, developing competencies 
using the skills of personnel , and organizing a firm 's activities in unique ways, 
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firms may succeed in achieving value for customers and a sustainable 
competitive advantage. 
Porter (1985) discussed the concept of sustainable competitive advantage 
when presenting the generic strategies of low cost or differentiation suggesting 
that the process of differentiation within the firm , beyond simply offering a lower 
price , but which offers something unique that is valuable to buyers, is an 
important source of sustainable competitive advantage. He also suggests that 
the differentiation is found in the product itself, or the service associated with the 
product. And so, a distinction can be made between the firm's resources, which 
can be termed a comparative advantage and competitive advantage. The 
differentiation is how the firm utilizes the resources and where it positions itself in 
the market place. 
Porter (1985) also suggests that it is the external forces, which the firm 
reacts to that in the end contribute most to the sustainable value creation , and in 
rapidly changing markets, it is difficult to pinpoint a time when the advantage can 
be classified as sustained . Firms that are flexible in utilizing their resources and 
capabilities , and can distinguish and react in advance to environmental changes, 
can take advantage of new emerging opportunities with reconfiguring their 
resource and capability base (Porter, 1996). 
D'Aveni (1995) suggested that theses approaches to explaining strategy 
might not be applicable in highly dynamic environments where leveraging unique 
resources or strategic positioning is likely going to be insufficient. Achrol and 
Stern (1988) described market dynamism as the degree of change in a market, 
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which includes elements such as customer demand, technology, and competitor 
structure. Firms competing in these markets are required to make frequent 
changes to products and services to respond to continuously changing customer 
demand, technology and business practices. 
Given the less dynamic nature of the global forest products industry and 
its markets, Porter's approach to strategy will be used to guide the results and 
analysis of this paper. Porter (1985) describes two basic types of competitive 
strategy, which enables a firm to achieve greater value for its customers and 
more profits for itself- cost advantage and differentiation. A cost advantage 
suggests that the firm is able to deliver the same benefits as competitors but at 
lower costs. A differentiation strategy provides customers with benefits that 
exceed those of competing products. Cost leadership best describes the 
dominant strategic approach utilized by the BC forest products industry. 
Environmental Scanning 
Chao (1999) describes environmental scanning as the acquisition of 
information about events, trends, and relationships in an industry's external 
environment that may influence its performance. Firms utilize the knowledge 
acquired to plan activities to respond to these environmental influences. The 
extent to which firms can adapt to the environmental influences largely depends 
on their abilities to know about and learn from the information acquired . Chao 
(1999) also reported that environmental scanning and the generative 
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organizational learning that results are directly linked with improved 
organizational performance. 
The terminology and methodology of environmental scanning are from the 
strategic planning literature. Environmental scanning is an important step for a 
firm to undertake in the process of developing a competitive strategy. It strives 
to identify the macro-environmental factors that the firm must consider when 
developing the best fit between a firm and its external environment, and is 
conducted assuming the need for continuous improvements to its strategic 
activities (Eadie 1989). 
The four key environments that may be identified for the purpose of an 
environmental scan include: political , economic, social and technological. 
• Political factors include areas such as tax policy, employment laws, 
environmental regulations, trade restrictions and tariffs and political stability, 
• Economic factors include economic growth, interest rates, exchange rates 
and inflations rates, 
• Social factors consider cultural issues, population growth rates, 
demographics, career attitudes and safety concerns, 
• Technology factors include research and development activity, automation, 
technological incentives and the rate of technological change. 
National Competitiveness 
Ideas about competitiveness and the advantage of nations traces back to 
the early economic literature by Adam Smith and David Ricardo (Bowles, 2007). 
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Smith argued that the determinants of a nation's wealth were in its endowments 
of land , capital , natural resources and labour. Ricardo introduced the theory of 
comparative advantage, which is based on the principle that nations should 
produce those goods and services for which it has the greatest relative cost 
advantage. Contemporary models, such as the national diamond (Figure 2) 
proposed by Porter (1990), define a new dimension to national competitiveness. 
Porter's theory is based on the idea that the capacity of an economy to sell its 
products is also based upon factors such as efficiency and modes of competition . 
Porter argues that these attributes are created not inherited. In his model, Porter 
describes the determinants of a nation's advantage as: factor conditions, demand 
cond itions; firm strategy, structure and rivalry, and related and supporting 
industries. 
Determinants are favourable when they help promote and stimulate 
individual firms and clusters of firms to continually upgrade and widen their 
advantages over competing firms in other nations. The role of governments is to 
offer the most productive environment for firms by supporting the development of 
favourable determinants. However, this does not guarantee success. In fact the 
more dynamic the national determinants, the more likely it is that some firms may 
fail because not all have equal skills and resources, and do not exploit the 
national determinants equally. However, Porter suggests that companies that 














Figure 2: Porters National Diamond , 
Source: Adapted from Porter (1990) 
Porter (1990) stresses that the role of governments at national and 
regional levels is to offer the most productive environment to help businesses 
develop and continually upgrade their competitive advantage. Governments 
achieve this by influencing and re-enforcing the four determinants of national 
competitive advantage. This influence can lead to both positive and negative 
effects. For example, national competitive advantages built entirely on 
government policies designed to provide a cost advantage will eventually fail, as 
other governments move to duplicate these advantages. To positively support 
the determinants, governments must encourage companies to raise their 
performance by stimulating early demand for advanced products, focusing on 
specialized factor creation and stimulating local rivalry by limiting direct 
cooperation and enforcing anti-trust regulations. Porter suggests that these 
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types of policies facilitate long-term competitive advantage because they are 
difficult to imitate, and are often intensely uncomfortable for firms. 
Porter also suggests that chance plays an important role by altering the 
conditions that affect the determinants. Chance refers to conditions that are 
outside the power of firms to influence, such as shifts in financial markets, 
exchange rates, changes in demand and political decisions by foreign 
governments. These types of conditions can have the effect of catalyzing 
periods of innovation and investment or conversely disrupt customer 
relationships. Porter views that nations with the most favourable diamond are 
those that are most likely to convert chance events into competitive advantage. 
While the role of government is different from private firms, it is interrelated in 
creating a productive economy. 
Martin and Porter (2001) in their paper "Canadian Competitiveness: A 
Decade after the Crossroads" provided a critique of Canada's diamond and 
suggested that it was weak. The authors suggested that Canada needed a clear 
national vision for its resource-based industries. By contrast, several countries 
with firms that are strong competitors in this forest products industry, such as 
Finland , Sweden and Chile have a clear national sense of their firm's core 
competencies and support them with appropriate policies. 
There are some economists who criticize Porter's model and some of the 
judgements made about which factors are important (Grant 1991 , Davies and 
Ellis 2000). However, Porter's national diamond remains a widely used 
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framework for analysing the resources and constraints that influence a nations 




In the following section, the information collected from the literature review 
is used to support an understanding of the macro-level environmental influences 
on the BC forest products industry and its current position and structure as 
observed by using Porter's (1985) five forces model. 
Environmental Scan of the B. C. Forest Products Industry 
As observed from the literature, an important part of strategic planning for 
any firm involves understanding the environmental factors that influence it. By 
monitoring the relevant environmental changes influencing B.C.'s forest products 
industry, a firm competing in the industry can formulate strategies to help it 
respond to the changes in order to survive and prosper. Environmental scanning 
typically focuses on factors both external and internal to the firm (Croft 2007). 
The two methods of scanning the external environment are PEST and Porter's 
( 1985) five forces model. 
PEST Analysis 
The PEST analysis is a framework to help a firm assess the macro-level 
environmental factors , which are external to it. PEST is an acronym for Political , 
Economic, Social and Technological factors , which may be currently impacting 
the industry's market place (Croft 2007). 
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Figure 3: Diagram of PEST Analysis 
Political Conditions 
Social 
Conditio~ ---- -------------- Economic --------Conditions 
Technological Conditions 
Political Conditions - There are a number of political factors affecting the 
forest industry today. These include trade restrictions and other trade barriers in 
many export markets, unresolved Aboriginal and treaty rights over provincial 
Crown forestlands, federal and provincial policies that restrict industry 
consolidation and discourage capital investment, a changing provincial forest 
policy regime that has increased in complexity creating uncertainty and added 
cost to timber supplies, and the ongoing threat of market campaigns aimed at 
boycotting B.C. forest products over debates about forestry practices. 
Exports of Canadian softwood lumber into the U.S. market are governed 
by the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA). The SLA is a complex 
agreement that imposes export tariffs and volume restrictions as a means of 
controlling softwood lumber shipments into the U.S. Shipments are restrained by 
setting explicit bounds on physical shipments from each province. The export 
charges or boarder measures are charged and collected by the Canadian 
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government when the price of lumber is at or below U.S.$355 per thousand 
board feet (FA&IT 2006). 
The impact of the SLA and its current boarder tax on BC producers is 
likely to have a negative impact on competitiveness. It provides distortions in 
production costs forcing BC manufacturers to make shorter term investment 
decisions based on the boarder tax rather than on sustainable longer term 
drivers of competitiveness. 
A unique feature of this agreement, which impacts both countries is the 
anti circumvention clause. This clause states that neither country will take action 
to circumvent and offset the commitments made in the agreement. This 
suggests that the Canadian and provincial governments cannot change laws, 
regulations or forest management programs which could result in cost saving to 
the industry. This could severely restrict the role of the Canadian and provincial 
governments in helping to improve the competitiveness of the forest industry 
(Waddell 2007). Other non-tariff barriers such as environmental and 
technological criteria, which are imposed by some countries, can also limit the 
import of B.C forest products. These include building codes, product standards 
and eco-labelling requirements (NRCan 2008). 
The Canadian Constitution protects Aboriginal and treaty rights in Canada, 
and Canadian case law recognizes claims to Aboriginal and treaty rights. The 
Canadian courts continue to clarify the nature of these rights and the impact that 
they may have on the relationships between Aboriginal communities, 
governments, and businesses in Canada. This often raises the uncertainty for 
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resource industries like the forest industry that holds forest tenures, which may 
overlap with or impact Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
Canada's Competition Act (1985) attempts to maintain and increase 
competition in Canada by ensuring that small and medium-sized businesses 
have an opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy. In doing so, the 
Act can restrict or prevent mergers or acquisitions of Canadian firms. This 
restriction can limit the ability of firms to increase their production capacity in 
regions where they may already own manufacturing assets. This is an important 
consideration given the global nature of markets and competition. While B.C. 
forest products firms are growing, they are still small by international standards 
(Roberts et al . 2004). Figure 2 compares the largest firms in the sector globally 
measured by 2005 total sales revenue. Cantor Corporation, which is B.C.'s 
largest forest products firm , was 29th in total sales when compared to the top 100 
global forest products companies. Canada's largest company, Abitibi-Bowater 
was 12th followed by Domtar-Weyco at 13th place, Abitibi Consolidated at 21st 
place and Domtar at 2ih place. 
Figure 4: Top 100 Global Forest Products Firms- 2005 Total sales (US$ billions) 
Source: FPAC. Available at: http://www.fpac.ca 
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Taxation on capital investment in Canada's forest industry is among the 
highest rates paid when compared with other global producing regions. Given 
the increased international mobility of capital , taxation rates higher than other 
industrialized countries acts to discourage capital investment in Canada (FPAC 
2007 and Giammarino 1998). 
The current forest policy regime in British Columbia has evolved over 
many years. The regime controls the firm's access and cost of timber from 
provincial Crown lands. Timber cost is the single largest input cost for the forest 
products firm in B.C. The political nature of forestry in the province has resulted 
in ongoing changes to these policies, as the provincial government tries to 
balance the economic, social and environmental values demanded by society. 
Government administrators have extensive scope to regulate and add to the 
forest industry's costs (BC Competition Council 2006). In attempting to achieve 
this balance, B.C.'s complex forest policy regime has likely worsened the 
industry's competitive position by forcing tenure holders to provide non-timber 
and environmental services that have increased the cost and increased 
uncertainty of the timber supply (Haley et al. 2006). 
The debate about sustainable forestry practices and B.C.'s forest policies 
has been ongoing for many years. This debate has now moved to the 
marketplace, where Environmental Non-governmental Organizations are 
targeting key customers of specific B.C forest products firms, promoting the 
purchase of eco-labelled forest products. This drive to certify forest products can 
restrict access and increase the cost of timber supplies. 
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Economic Conditions- The economic factors that affect B.C.'s forest 
products industry include currency exchange rates, access to capital, and market 
demand trends. The industry has always been a major contributor to the 
provincial economy. In 2006, this sector manufactured over $15 billion worth of 
forest products, which represents 35.6% of the total of all manufacturing 
industries in BC (Council of Forest Industries 2008). Over 80% of this production 
was shipped to U.S. markets. However, the industry's contribution to the 
provincial economy has been slipping in recent years. In 1999, the sector 
manufactured over $17.6 billion worth of forest products, which was 
approximately 48% of the total of all manufacturing industries in BC. Direct 
employment in the industry has also dropped from 94,808 jobs in 1999 to 81,600 
jobs in 2006 (BC Stats 2008). The overall competitiveness of the B.C. industry is 
declining as new, lower cost firms emerge, and capture market share in many of 
B.C. traditional product markets (BC Competition Council 2006). 
In 2006, the U.S. Housing starts were 1,838,900 units. In 2007, starts 
dropped to 1 ,380,500. In 2008, the U.S Department of Housing and Urban 
Development forecast housing starts for the year to be 1 ,048,000. This 
represents a 24% drop from the previous year and a 43% drop from 2006. Long-
range forecasts suggest that this market will not likely rebound until sometime in 
2009 (WoodMarkets 2008). There are also rising concerns about the U.S 
economy and as a result, it is expected that demand for wood products will 
continue to be weak. 
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The BC forest products industry also ranks as the lowest amongst its 
global competition when comparing Return on Capital Employed (ROCE). 
Emerging regions such as Latin America and South Africa are posting the 
highest average ROCE, which is putting significant competitive pressures on the 
BC firms, and limiting their ability to access capital. Credit markets have also 
tightened considerably as a result of the U.S. banking crisis, making it more 
difficult for firms to obtain financing. Other factors such as the Canadian/U .S. 
currency exchange rate and rising input costs such as energy are also 
contributing to the BC forest industry's decline (Roberts et al. 2004 ). 
Roberts et al. (2004) also conclude that real prices for most commodity 
forest products including lumber have trended downward over the past 18 years. 
They predict that this downward trend will continue due to lower productions 
costs, increasing global supply, few barriers to entry but high barriers to exit for 
the industry. This downward pressure on commodity prices overall has been 
clearly observed and documented since 1800 (Martin and Porter 2001 ). 
The recent Mountain Pine Beetle infestation in the central interior of British 
Columbia is also expected to reduce timber supplies by as much as 50% in some 
regions (BC Ministry of Forests and Range 2006a). 
In addition, the long-term devaluation of the Canadian dollar, in U.S. 
funds, has obscured the real decline in global competitiveness of many 
marginally profitable mills (BC Competition Council 2006). This has encouraged 
excess capacity to prevail , undermining the viability of mills that have made 
consistent strides to remain competitive through productivity gains. 
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Social Conditions- The social factors affecting the B.C. forest industry 
include the impact of changing social values on the provinces forest policy 
regime, an aging workforce and changing career attitudes, and the general safety 
concerns associated with the industry. 
Over the past 30 years provincial forest policies in British Columbia have 
changed in direct response to changing public values associated with provincial 
forestlands. Forest policies traditionally were focused on supporting industrial 
development, however, today they are primarily focused on attempting to achieve 
a multiple of social , economic and environmental values on public forestlands 
(Haley et al. 2006). These changes have increased the complexity of operating 
on provincial Crown lands for forest companies that hold forest tenures. 
Many B.C. forest industry firms, particularly those located in northern 
communities are currently having a difficult time recruiting and retaining skilled 
trades workers , forest professionals and managers. This has been a recurring 
problem, and in some cases, key positions remain vacant for several months 
while the firm tries to recruit new employees. While some of the difficulties in 
attracting and retaining employees are likely due to a general labour market 
tightening , it is also expected that there are shortages of labour in specific 
occupations and trades, due to an aging population. The 2004-2005 Conference 
Board of Canada report on "The World and Canada: Trends Reshaping Our 
Future, Performance and Key Findings" points out that Canada's aging 
population is increasing at a much faster rate than children are being born. This 
means in the next few decades there will not be the population of younger 
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workers to replace the older workers as they retire. There is also a general 
economy-wide movement away from resource industries and a movement 
towards knowledge-based industries, which will influence career choices for 
workers entering the workforce or considering new employment opportunities 
(Huq. 2007). 
Technological Conditions - The primary technological factor that has 
affected the forest industry is its recent lack of investment in R&D. The industry 
has a very high debt to equity ratio, which has resulted in the industry not 
investing in new technology (Maness 2006). The Forest Products Association of 
Canada (2007) suggests that the Canada's very high tax on capital investment 
may also be reducing the incentives for investments in innovation. This lack of 
investment has created a competitive disadvantage when compared to other 
producing regions that have invested in R&D and employed new technologies 
(Maness 2006 and FPAC 2007). Figure 3 compares the amount of spending on 
R&D, as a percentage of gross revenues for Scandinavian, U.S. and Canadian 
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Figure 5. Proportion of Forest Sector Revenue Spend on R&D. Source FPAC. 
Available at:http://www.fpac.ca/en/pdfs/forest_sector_innovation_response_E.pdf 
The effects of rapid technological change and globalization further 
exacerbate the industry's relatively low investment level in R&D. Competition 
arises much more quickly, and with greater intensity than before (Lall 2004) 
Innovation in tree growing has significantly reduced the reliance on natural 
forests in Canada and the U.S. This includes conversion of marginal agriculture 
lands into fast growing tree plantations in places like Brazil , Chile, Argentina and 
other parts of South America, Australia , New Zealand, South Africa, China and 
Indonesia. Shorter rotations and the applications of tree breeding programs and 
biotechnology have increased yields and substantially reduced the financial risks 
associated with holding this inventory (Bael et al. 2006). 
Bael and Sedjo (2006) claim that technological innovations, along with 
reduced costs of transport, and greater mobility of labour and capital have shifted 
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the comparative advantage from developed countries to developing countries in 
the southern hemisphere. 
Nelson et al. (2006) also reported that new process technologies have 
reduced the B.C.'s historical advantage. The end result has been product prices 
that that have remained flat or trended downwards over time. On the cost side, 
the authors also point out that resource conditions have been deteriorating while 
the stumpage fees paid have often increased higher than a market with private 
forest land owners would have. And, the cost of labour remains the highest 
levels paid anywhere in the world. 
Five Forces Model 
Porter (1985) outlines five forces, which he suggests influence competition 
within an industry. Understanding these forces and their underlying causes are 
the key to understanding an industry's attractiveness, or long-term profitability. 
The purpose of this assessment is to consider the micro-environmental factors 
that are currently affecting competition in the global softwood lumber industry and 
the assessment is based on the perspective of a public corporation in the central 
interior of BC, producing 3 billion board feet of lumber each year. 
The results of the PEST assessment will also be considered in this five 
forces assessment, as many of the conditions raised will play an important role in 
influencing the micro-environmental factors. 
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High Rivalry Among Competitors - The North American softwood 
lumber industry has a large number of firms who compete for many of the same 
customers. North American lumber production in 2007 totalled 51 .5 billion board 
feet and the largest 40 firms in North American produced only 62 % of this 
production. There is also substantial diversity among the largest competitors in 
North America when comparing the number of manufacturing plants owned and 
their total manufacturing capacities. The number of manufacturing facilities 
owned by firms ranges from 1 facility to 25 facilities, and production capacity at 
each facility ranges from under 100 million board feet to over 500 million board 
feet, with the average being 140 million board feet (Wood Markets 2008). This 
low concentration and high diversity results in increased rivalry. 
In a global context, the central interior softwood lumber firm is considered 
to be small relative to its global competitors. When comparing 2006 sales 
revenue, twenty-seven U.S firms made the list of top 100 firms in the world. In 
Western Europe twenty-five companies were in the list of top 100 firms and in 
Canada only twelve firms made the list of top 1 00 firms (Price Waterhouse 
Coopers 2007). As highlighted by the PEST, the ability for the BC interior firm to 
grow by acquiring or merging with other lumber producers in the same 
geographic area is restricted due to the federal Competition Act. 
The U.S. is the largest softwood lumber market in the world. In 2007, the 
U.S. consumed 51.5 billion board feet. In 2008, U.S. lumber consumption is 
forecast to drop to 43 billion board feet. This represents over a 20 billion board 
foot drop from 2005, when the U.S consumed 64 billion board feet. This decline 
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in consumption is equal to the total shipments of Canada's largest 20 lumber 
producers in 2007 (Wood Markets, 2008). This decline in U.S. consumption also 
demonstrates the cyclical nature of the business, which has resulted in high 
rivalry among North American producers. 
February 2008 framing lumber prices in the U.S. moved to cyclical lows 
not seen in 17 years. Analysts anticipate that at these prices, virtually no 
commodity lumber producer anywhere in North America will be profitable. Many 
analysts also predict that these low prices will continue until enough firms reduce 
or close manufacturing capacity to match the low levels of product demand 
(Wood Markets 2008). Overall global demand for wood products has also been 
stagnant over the past 20 years (Bael et al. 2006), while industrial roundwood 
production has increased by approximately 14% during this same period. Today, 
global demand for wood products remains low compared to the current 
manufacturing capacity, resulting in a huge oversupply. In the longer term as 
global populations continue to grow, this oversupply situation is expected to 
change. 
Another characteristic of the forest industry that contributes to rivalry are 
its relatively high fixed costs, which are those costs that do not contribute to costs 
of goods sold. This results in firms striving to produce at or near capacity to 
attain their lowest unit cost of production. This results in intensified rivalry as 
firms continue to operate and produce lumber in excess of market demand. This 
is particularly evident in the U.S. market today. 
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Product differentiation and brand identification in the softwood lumber 
sector are both low, which results in a low switching cost for buyers. Low 
switching costs in an oversupplied market results in firms becoming price takers 
or face having to close their operations. As a result firms are forced to continue 
to operate in an attempt to reduce loses and retain customers. This puts 
tremendous pressure on firms to be low cost producers in order to sustain 
themselves during poor markets. 
Forest companies can also be characterized as having high exit barriers 
due to their asset specificity. Manufacturing facilities in the industry are highly 
specialized and typically cannot be sold to buyers in other industries. As a result, 
firms are left to compete, or face selling their assets at low salvage values. 
Low Barriers to Entry- In British Columbia, forest tenures cover all of the 
available timber supply on public lands. This has provided a competitive 
advantage for the BC interior firm, because it holds tenure, which has restricted 
the ability for new entrants that did not. In recent years however, access to 
timber for new entrants has increased due to changes to forest tenure policy. 
Approximately 20 percent of the provincial timber supply is now available through 
short-term tenures. This timber is sold through a competitive bidding process to 
anyone who can meet the contractual obligations. 
Historically, the tenure system has also provided holders of long-term 
tenure, with the legal protection of property rights associated with the tenure, 
which has acted as a barrier for new entrants, similar to the legal protection 
provided by intellectual property laws (Cashore et al. 2001 ). However, with the 
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changing social values and the uncertainty of Aboriginal and treaty rights 
highlighted in the PEST, these property rights are being impacted by provincial 
forest policies, which are being changed to address both the changing values 
and Aboriginal rights. 
In the US, much of the forestland in the northeast and south is privately 
held by a large number of small landowners who sell their timber to the highest 
bidder. In many cases this favours new entrants with new lumber manufacturing 
technology because they are able to pay more for their raw materials due to their 
lower conversion costs. In addition, many of the private landowners do not have 
long term contractually obligations with manufacturing facilities allowing them to 
hold onto their inventory until prices are favourable. 
There are also few economies of scale that prevent new entrants from 
entering the softwood lumber industry. Laakonen-Craig (2007) reported that 
there is no statistical evidence of a relationship between total sales and 
profitability in the forest industry, despite expected economies of scale. Many of 
the new entrants from countries in the southern hemisphere were performing on 
par or better than large established firms in North America (Laalonen-Craig 2007 
and Roberts 2004). The new entrants have the advantage of utilizing new 
technology when constructing their assets, which provides an immediate 
conversion cost advantage over the BC firm , which is utilizing older technology. It 
is also expected that lumber exports from southern hemisphere countries utilizing 
plantation timber will double from 2002 to 2020 (Bael et al. 2006). 
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As suggested by the PEST, high capital taxes and access to capital may 
have contributed to a lack of investment in upgrading the technology used by the 
BC interior firm , which has likely increased its conversion costs, relative to new 
entrants. 
The BC interior firm also has low product differentiation and little brand 
equity, making it easy for new entrants to access existing markets provided their 
costs are low. High product differentiation and brand loyalty create barriers to 
entry, because new firms must overcome the brand awareness and the customer 
loyalty with competitor's products. Some lumber firms attempt to differentiate 
their products based on service, supply chain management and quality, but 
because lumber products are generally viewed as commodities and given the 
current oversupply in most markets, customers will base their purchasing 
decisions on price. 
Overall , the BC interior firm is experiencing poor financial performance. 
Roberts, Lethbridge and Carreau (2004) reported that between 1998 and 2003 
even the most profitable forest products producing regions have not covered their 
cost of capital , suggesting that the interior firm will have difficulty attracting new 
capital. This will likely make the lumber industry less attractive to new entrants. 
As highlighted in the PEST, the current Softwood Lumber Agreement with 
the U.S. also has the effect of restricting lumber shipments from the BC interior 
thereby allowing global lumber producers, and potentially new entrants to ship 
lumber products into the U.S. market. 
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Moderate Bargaining Power of Suppliers -Access to competitively 
priced raw materials, labour, and transportation to markets is critical for the firm's 
success. In BC, where the provincial government owns the majority of the 
forestland and controls access through the tenure system, timber pricing and 
security of supply can often be unstable. This directly affects the BC firm's 
profitability (FPAC 2007). However, Howlett and Rayner (2001) also suggest 
that the government's dependence on forest-generated income for general 
revenue purposes and their unwillingness to invest in timber management has 
created a strong bargaining position for firms holding tenure. Tenure holders 
have become a critical partner in the policy negotiations as they provide the 
processing facilities, marketing know-how and technical and professional 
knowledge essential for timber management. 
The labour force is also a powerful supplier in British Columbia, but 
typically not at the international level. For the BC interior firm, its labour 
workforce is organized, keeping labour rates high. In addition, switching costs for 
labour are relatively low when there is high demand in other sectors. In addition, 
the PEST identified that the BC interior firm is faced with an aging workforce and 
changing career attitudes among new employees. This will make it difficult to 
attract new employees as the current workforce begins to retire. 
The BC interior firm relies on a combination of truck, rail and ocean 
carriers to access its markets. While truck transportation is readily available, 
equipment is not specialized making it easy for trucks to switch to other sectors 
that may be willing to pay more for their service. When using rail transportation, 
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the BC interior firm has no options, resulting in a near monopoly for the rail 
company. Research commissioned by the Forest Products Association 
concluded that Canada's current rail transportation policy framework is failing to 
limit the market power of the rail industry (FPAC 2007) resulting in high costs and 
poor rail service. Offshore export markets like Japan and China require access 
to ports and ocean carriers, at competitive rates . 
Moderate Bargaining Power of Customers - The bargaining power of 
customers for lumber products is a function of their market share, lumber supply, 
their switching costs and threat of backward integration. In the U.S. market, 
buyers are considered fragmented in some channels and concentrated in others. 
Homebuilders across the U.S are typically regionally focused with small market 
share purchasing small quantities. Retail outlets such as Home Depot, Lowes 
and IKEA have become very concentrated , with significant market share, 
purchasing large quantities and resulting in an oligopsony structure (Kant and 
Mehrotra 2007). In 2007, Home Depot was number 17 on the Fortune 500 list of 
America's largest corporations (Fortune500 2008). The current oversupply in 
most global markets also gives buyers significant power. 
With little product differentiation for the BC interior firm , the switching costs 
for its buyers is low, and given the current excess supply, customers can demand 
improvements in quality and service without impacting price. The marketing and 
sales sophistication of forest product firms also has a bearing on their ability to 
sell into specific channels. Firms who wish to minimize their costs of marketing 
and sales will sell to wholesalers and distributors, while others who are prepared 
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to put effort into marketing and sales attempt to access more sophisticated 
channels such as the large retailers. New entrants can tap into these distribution 
channels easily provided they are low cost producers. 
The recent increase in global environmental awareness has also provided 
large buyers such as Home Depot with additional leverage over the BC interior 
firm. Larger retailers are often targets of marketing campaigns by Environmental 
Non-government Organizations, as highlighted by the PEST. This results in 
retailers making additional demands for eco-labelling from suppliers like the BC 
firm , which is not reflected in the purchase price. 
Moderate Threat of Substitute Products - The extent to which different 
products will be used as substitutes for softwood lumber products is a function of 
price and quality. There are substitute products available today, such as steel 
studs and these are sold by promoting their superior performance over softwood 
studs. However, given the current oversupply and low commodity prices, the 
threat of substitute products such as steel studs is moderate. When commodity 
lumber prices increase however, the threat of substitute products will become 
higher. 
Other factors that impact the threat of substitutes is the switching costs for 
buyers. For some channels such as homebuilders, this is considered high 
because of the cost of specialized supplies required to build with substitute 
products . In addition, a well-established supply chain may also favour existing 
suppliers, as this will increase the switching costs of buyers. 
The following table summarizes the results of the Five Forces analysis. 
61 
Table 3: Summary of Five Forces Analysis 




Barriers to Entry Low 
Supplier Power Moderate 
Buyer Pow er Moderate 
Threats of Moderate 
Substitutes 
The forces currently affecting competition within the global softwood 
lumber sector of the forest products industry are intense, resulting in low financial 
returns on investment over the long term. While rivalry in the industry is high, it is 
clearly not the only force limiting the industry's profitability. The current global 
overcapacity and oversupply of commodity lumber products from new sources 
will continue to keep profitability for the BC interior firm low. These forces will 
likely result in the firm being forced to take down time or close its higher cost 
facilities during periods of low demand when product prices fall below their 
variable cost of production . In addition, the firm will likely seek efficiency through 
rationalization and consolidation. Industry downturns will also continue to occur 
routinely due to the cyclical nature of the economy and consumer confidence. 
Given the current industry structure, the BC firm has no choice but to 
continue to compete using cost minimization as its primary competitive strategy. 
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As a result, the firm must continue to focus on reducing its costs in all areas of 
the business. Given that timber is the largest single input cost, continued access 




The forest industry today can be characterized as having poor financial 
performance, intense rivalry, low entry barriers and high exit barriers creating a 
situation where firms are forced to compete. When product demand is low, this 
results in oversupplied markets driving down commodity prices. New firms 
continue to enter the markets and out-compete B.C firms because of access to 
lower cost timber, the availability of new lower cost manufacturing technology 
and access to lower cost labour. 
In analyzing the possible effects of the three tenure reform options 
(corporatization, privatization, decentralization) on the five competitive forces, 
consideration is given to the effects on the economic value stream of holding the 
new form of tenure, and the implications to innovation. The key attributes chosen 
to assess the potential effects are: security of timber supply, cost of timber 
supply, and flexibility in the timber supply. 
Security of timber supply has always been a prerequisite for capital 
investment in B.C. and the lack of security has been a major concern with the 
current tenure system. Firms will want to have high security of supply to rebuild 
confidence in order to attract capital for new investment and innovation. 
However, it should be noted that access to a timber supply does not necessarily 
mean that the supply must be secured through long-term tenure arrangements 
such as those found in B.C. Currently, many firms in the U.S. do not have long-
term timber supply sources secured through land ownership or forest tenure. 
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Instead, firms rely on their lower production costs and strategic plant locations to 
enable them to pay competitive prices for timber that is sold regularly on the 
open market. This approach reduces the carrying cost of large timber inventories 
and reduces the risk of loss or damage to standing inventories for the firm. 
However, firms do run the risk of having timber shortages at critical periods in the 
market cycle. 
The cost of supply will be extremely important as firms continue to drive 
out costs in order to compete in commodity forest markets. The environmental 
scan demonstrates that firms selling into forest products commodity markets 
have few options other than to continue to use cost leadership as their 
competitive strategy. High competitor rivalry combined with slow market growth 
and significant barriers to exit continue to drive firm behaviour. Important cost 
drivers of the firm 's operating activities include economies of scale, patterns of 
capacity utilization, timing and learning. Any added fixed costs will also be a 
factor. 
Firms will view having flexibility in the timber supply as desirable. 
Flexibility will enable firms to make optimum choices about when to harvest 
timber, which specific timber products to harvest and which markets to enter. As 
markets become more dynamic, flexibility will be an important part of any new 
tenure system 
Corporatization 
For the purposes of this analysis , corporatization of the provincial forest 
resource involves creating a provincial Crown Corporation that is accountable for 
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all aspects of forest management including planning , development, timber 
selling , reforestation , and protection, while retaining ownership. The 
Corporation's mandate will include maximizing profits from timber sales, while 
meeting the environmental and social objectives of the Crown. Firms will 
purchase timber from the Corporation in both a standing timber and log form , 
through a competitive bidding process. Timber sales will be offered in a range of 
timber types, size of area and length of sale. 
Effects on Competitive Rivalry- Under the corporatization model of 
tenure reform, the security of timber supplies will be low. While the Crown 
Corporation will be at arms length from the provincial government, the 
Corporation will be required to fulfill the multiple of provincial goals and objectives 
for the resource, which may change depending on the political party and the 
potential for political interference. This model does not guarantee or provide 
preferential access to timber and as a result, may not create the confidence 
necessary to promote increased capital investment or innovation . 
It is likely that under this model , the competitive bidding process will 
increase the cost of timber in areas with a high concentration of firms with 
manufacturing facilities in close proximity. Increased competition may result in 
reducing the number of firms in areas of high concentration. Firms with high 
costs may not be able to survive. 
While the competitive bidding process will increase local rivalry and 
potentially reduce the number of firms, corporatization will not affect market 
growth, low customer switching costs or the high exit barriers currently present in 
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the industry. Overall , corporatization of the provincial tenure system may have a 
slightly positive affect on global competitor rivalry. 
Effects on Barriers to Entry- As stated earlier the corporatization model 
will include the establishment of competitive log markets. This will attract new 
entrants within B.C.'s regional log markets. New entrants within these markets 
may have a competitive advantage if they have incorporated new technology in 
harvesting or manufacturing facilities over existing firms who have not invested in 
new equipment. 
The process of competitive sales may also substantially reduce the 
strength of the U.S. government's argument concerning softwood lumber trade 
with B.C. , since a substantial portion of their argument is based on the lack of 
competitive log markets. If this resulted in a reduction or removal of the export 
tax for B.C. softwood lumber products shipped to the U.S. , B.C. products would 
become more competitive, potentially reducing the attractiveness of U.S. markets 
to new entrants from other global regions. This could moderately raise the 
barriers to entry within the U.S. softwood lumber market. However, 
corporatization will not affect current asset specificity or organizational 
economies of scale. 
Effects on Supplier Power- Corporatization will maintain the near 
monopoly in timber sales throughout most of the province. There may also be a 
risk of timber shortages in the short term as the Corporations staff work to 
become efficient in their operations. Strong markets may also amplify this 
situation, when firms wish to add additional production capacity and need to 
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purchase additional timber supplies quickly. As a result, corporatization may 
increase the power of the timber supplier, and likely have no effect on other 
suppliers. 
Effects on Buyer Power- Corporatization will increase timber costs for 
some firms making them less cost competitive in the short term. Firms will have 
to look to other parts of the value chain to find cost reduction opportunities. For 
example, firms will no longer be responsible for planning, development, 
reforestation and protection of the resource , which will reduce activity costs. 
Costs associated with environmental protection measures will remain , and may 
increase as public concerns about the environment continue to increase. The 
competitive bidding process and higher logs costs, combined with reduced 
planning and protection obligations may also give rise to more efficient use of 
timber products, where firms direct logs to their highest and best use. 
Corporatization provides moderate flexibility for firms to be responsive to 
the cyclical nature of markets. When markets are low firms can easily reduce 
their lumber production levels and reduce their timber harvesting activities 
accordingly. However, when lumber markets are strong and firms want to add 
additional manufacturing capacity, getting quick access to large volumes may be 
difficult. Firms wishing to increase output quickly to respond to market 
opportunities may find it difficult to access addition timber supplies. In addition, 
low timber security will likely affect the willingness to invest capital in new 
technology or innovation. 
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Overall , corporatization may actually increase buyer power in cases where 
existing forest products firms become less cost competitive due to increased 
timber costs, and potential for timber shortages. 
Effects on Threat of Substitution - Increased competition for timber 
supplies will likely increase timber costs in some regions of the province. 
Increased input costs will reduce the competitiveness of exiting firms unless firms 
can find cost reduction opportunities in other parts of their value chain. Given 
that the threat of substitution is greater when forest product prices are high , 
corporatization of tenure will not affect this force. 
Privatization 
The privatization model involves selling British Columbia's public forests to 
private interests, but retain ownership in the land. Firms will be required to pay 
for the standing timber inventory at the time of purchase. This model also 
assumes that the provincial government will remove a number of the regulatory 
controls currently in place, but retain a high environmental standard. 
Over the years, there has not been much public support for privatization of 
public forestlands because of public opinion favouring public ownership, but also 
because when the crown owns the resource, the public bears the cost of its 
maintenance (Marchak, 1983). Pearse (1976) also noted that because public 
ownership bears the costs of carrying the forest inventory, the capital required to 
enter and operate in the industry is substantially reduced , as are the financial 
risks. In addition, the U.S. forest products industry has been divesting its 
ownership of U.S. forestlands. In the past 25 years, forest industry private lands 
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have been reduced by 50 percent, with nearly half of that decline in the past 
decade. Simultaneously the industry has increased its ownership of offshore 
forestlands similar to the trend among Nordic forest products companies. The 
notion is consistent with the globalization trend which has shifted the comparative 
advantage in industrial wood production from forest lands in North American to 
the forests to the southern hemisphere, where fast growing plantation forests 
carry a much lower risk (Bael et al. 2006). 
Competitor Rivalry- Under the privatization model firms will enjoy 
greater security of timber supply because of the long-term nature of the property 
rights. This increased security of supply may also provide incentives for some 
firms to increase innovation or make addition capital investments. The security 
and preferred access to timber should also reduce the cost of timber supplies 
compared to other tenure reform models. A reduced regulatory burden will also 
reduce activity costs. 
This model will also provide high flexibility so that firms can be responsive 
to the cyclical nature of the commodity forest product markets. When demand is 
high, firms will have quick access to additional supplies and when demand is low, 
firms will reduce timber-harvesting operations accordingly. 
Privatization will require access to capital to purchase the standing timber 
inventory, which will increase the fixed costs of the firm . This may cause some 
firms to exit the industry and potentially reduce the number and diversity of firms. 
In addition , firms that purchase timber will have to take on the risk associated 
with the standing inventory from such events as wildfires, windthrow and insect 
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outbreaks. But despite these added fixed costs, when firms harvest, their direct 
operating costs will be lower. 
Overall , privatization may not affect the current high exit barriers for the 
industry, low customer switching costs, or market conditions, however it may 
reduce the number and diversity of firms currently competing in B.C, which can 
affect global competitor rivalry. 
Barriers to entry- The capital costs required to purchase the standing 
timber under this model would raise entry barriers locally. In addition, lower input 
costs, potential for improved economies of scale and improved competitiveness 
will deter new entrants. Increased security may provide opportunities for 
innovation and enhance brand equity. 
The privatization model also reduces the strength of U.S. arguments in 
softwood lumber trade negotiations, assuming that the standing timber is sold at 
market value. Eliminating or lowering the export charges would result in 
improved competitiveness in U.S. markets. Overall , the privatization model could 
have the effect of raising barriers to entry in some markets. 
Supplier Power- The privatization option removes the timber supplier 
from the value chain and provides greater security of timber supply, lowering 
direct timber costs. This will not likely affect the power of transportation 
suppliers. 
Buyer Power- Assuming that the privatization option can lower input 
costs and result in lower total costs and provide flexibility to access timber 
supplies, firms can offer powerful buyers lower prices and larger volumes of 
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forest products. Security of supply also provides opportunities for firms to 
innovate and differentiate their products, and possibly find unique ways of 
branding their products . This may affect buyer power in some markets. 
Threat of substitutes - Privatization can lower input costs making firms 
more competitive , providing the opportunity to offer lower prices. Firms may also 
have more opportunity to innovate and develop brand loyalty under this model. 
Lower prices and product loyalty make substitutes less attractive. 
Decentralization 
The decentralization model involves the relocation of forest management 
authority and control away from the central provincial authority to a regional level 
authority, such as.regionally elected Management Boards. Under this model , the 
provincial government will retain land ownership, but boards would have the 
freedom to establish regional goals and objectives to maximize benefits from the 
regional forests . Boards will manage and sell timber and non-timber products, 
within the constraints of a set of environmental and social objectives provided by 
the provincial government. The regional boards will be responsible for most of 
the forest management activities. The provincial government would retain a 
certain level of strategic control , such as specifying the maximum allowable 
annual cut available within the regional forest. Firms will purchase timber sales 
in both a standing timber and log form , through a competitive bidding process. 
Boards will offer a range of timber sales including a variety of timber types, size 
of area and duration of sale. 
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Decentralization may also have the effect of reducing the overall available 
provincial timber supply, as the process for setting allowable annual cuts for 
smaller regions need not equal the current allowable annual cut for the entire 
province. 
Competitor Rivalry- Decentralization does not offer security of supply or 
preferred access to timber supplies. In addition, the model runs the risk of 
creating timber shortages if regional Management Boards decide to reserve or 
restrict areas from harvesting , or when management is not efficient at offering 
sufficient quantities of the appropriate timber sales when market demand is high. 
Like the Crown Corporation , Management Boards will attempt to sell timber 
competitively, which may result in increased timber prices in some areas. The 
combination of lower allowable annual cuts and increased prices due to 
competition may cause some firms to close . However, there will also more 
sellers with different goals under this model , which may also impact this result. 
Firms will also enjoy a reduced regulatory burden similar to the corporatization 
model , which will reduce activity costs. 
Overall , decentralization may reduce the number of competing firms in a 
region due to the reduced timber supply, which may have a small affect on 
competitive rivalry in the global forest products market. 
Barriers to Entry- Decentralization does increase competition for timber 
at the regional level , providing opportunities for new entrants, and favouring new 
entrants with newer technology. However, there will be lower timber supplies 
available, which will impact this. This increased level of competition will increase 
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timber costs in areas of higher firm concentration and high demand. Overall 
reduced timber supplies and low security of supply will likely reduce the 
opportunity for firms to pursue economies of scale. 
Like corporatization, decentralization incorporates competitive sales, 
which could reduce the strength of the U.S government's arguments concerning 
softwood lumber trade with B.C. If this resulted in a reduction or removal of 
export charges B.C products would become more competitive, potentially 
reducing the attractiveness of the U.S. market to new entrants from other global 
regions. However, without the opportunity for increasing economy of scale, 
decentralization is not likely to have a significant affect on increasing barriers to 
entry in the U.S. market. 
Supplier Power- Under the decentralized model the number of sellers is 
increased providing firms with the opportunity to purchase timber sales from a 
number of regions. This will reduce supplier power for timber sellers, however 
decentralization will not likely affect other suppliers such as transportation and 
services. 
Buyer Power- Decentralization will not provide opportunities for 
substantial timber cost reductions. The model may even create timber shortages 
and increase costs. The model does not provide much flexibility to be responsive 
to market demand however, it may be more responsive than the centralized 
model because of the increased number of sellers. The model may provide 
opportunities for some innovation and branding in regions where Management 
Boards are receptive. Overall, decentralization is not likely to affect buyer power. 
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Threat of Substitutes- Decentralization will not provide opportunities for 
cost reduction and will likely increase timber costs in some regions through 
increased competition. Given that threat of substitutes is greater when product 
prices area high, decentralization will not affect the threat of substitutes. 
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Table 4: Effects of the Three Tenure Reform Options on the Five Forces 
Five Forces I Corporatization I Privatization I Decentralization 
h Competitor Rivalry 
Large number of competrtors , 1. Low security of timber supplies, 1. High security of timber supplies , 1. Lower security of supply in some areas 
High diversrty in facilrty capabilrties, 2. Increased competrtion resuHing in increased 2. High flexibilrty to be responsive to cyclical 2. Increased competrtion and increased costs for 
High fixed costs, costs, which may cause high cost firms nature of markets, timber in areas of high demand, may encourage 
Slow market growth, to close, 3. High inrtial caprtal costs, may force high cost new entrants and force high cost firms to close, 
Low brand & product differentiation, 3. Moderate regulatory burden compared to firms to close, 3. Reduced administration costs due to lower 
High exrt barriers. existing tenures , 4. Increased fixed costs, regulatory burden compared to existing tenures, 
4. Moderate flexibilrty to be responsive to cyclical 5. Lower direct t imber costs due to preferred 4. Increase local rivalry, and no impact globally 
nature of markets. access and low regulatory burden, 
6. Opportunrty to become more innovative in 
timber management and products, brand and 
differentiation, 
7. Reduced local rivalry , and some impact 
globally , abilrty to reduce prices in response 
to rivals. 
v Barriers to Entry 
f;,creasing supply of low cost plantation 1. Increases volume of timber sold competrtively 1. Abilrty to keep prices low to deter new 1. Increases volume of timber sold competrtively 
Imber from southern hemisphere, favouring new entrants , entrants , favouring new entrants, 
crease in local competitive timber sales, 2. Increasing cost of fibre due to competrtive sales , 2. Caprtal cost and preferred access to timber 2. Moderate cost increase of timber due to 
ew technology favours new entrants , potentially favouring new entrants, supplies raises barriers to entry, competrtive sales , potentially favouring new 
pact of globalization favouring new 3. Reduces strength of US arguments in soflwood 3. Opportunity to become more innovative in entrants 
mtrants, lumber trade negotiations. timber, 3. Reduces strength of US arguments in soflwood ro; Brand & Product Differentiation, management, potentially increasing brand lumber trade negotiations 
flwood Lumber Agreement favouring non and differentiation, 
anadian producers. 4. Reduces strength of US arguments in 
soflwood lumber trade negotiations. 
lerate Supplier Power 
rovincial gOY!Jmment is dominant supplier 1. Higher timber costs resuHing in greater supplier 1. Provincial government no longer dominant 1. Higher timber costs resuHing in some 
timber, power, supplier, increase in supplier power, 
nionized labour force keeping wages high, 2. Lower timber security resuHing in greater 2. Lower timber costs provide some insulation 2. Increased number of sellers reducing power, 
trength of transportation suppliers. supplier power, from powerful suppliers , 2. Lower timber security, reducing power. 
3. Near monopoly in timber sales. 2. Increased timber security reducing supplier 
power. 
lerate Buyer Power 
arge buyers in some segments, 1. Low timber security and higher costs increase 1. Ability to offer lower prices to powerful buyers, 1. Moderate increase in timber costs, resutting in 
ow brand and product differentiation buyer power, 2. Abilrty to offer higher volumes to powerful some increase to buyer power, 
!sutting in low switching costs for 2. Low opportunity to innovative in timber customers, 2. Potential to cause higher cost firms to close, 
II buyers, management, maintaining low brand and 3. Provides flexibilrty to respond to cyclical 3. Reduced timber security increasing buyer 
rl\lironmental market campaigns . product differentiation nature of business, power, 
3. Some flexibility to be responsive to periods of 4. Opportunity to become more innovative 4. Opportunity to innovate in timber management, 
high market demand, resuHing in timber in timber management , potentially potentially increasing brand and product 
shortages. increasing brand and product differentiation. differentiiiltion, 
5. Low flexibi lrty to be responsive to periods of 
high market demand resutting in timber shortages. 
ierate Threats of Substitutes 
uperior performing substrtutes. !. Wrth higher log costs , firms will be forced 1. Firms will have lower direct log costs allowing I. Wrth higher log costs, firms will be forced 
reats are higher when forest product to curtail operations sooner during poor markets. them to continue to operate longer when market to curtail operations sooner during poor markets. 
emand and prices are high, prices are low. 
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Discussion 
The analysis demonstrates that each tenure reform option has the 
potential to affect one or more of the five forces by some degree. Each option 
will affect local competitor rivalry. Privatization offers the most significant affects 
in the short term, but given that the capital costs and risk associated with this 
model, this may not be feasible in some areas of the province. Each model can 
have some affect on entry barriers, assuming that they can affect trade 
negotiations with the U.S government. Supplier power is most significantly 
affected by privatization followed by decentralization. The supplier power of the 
transportation industry and other services will not likely be affected. Buyer power 
may be affected by privatization if the firm is motivated to innovate, and each 
model has the ability to reduce the number of firms by forcing the high cost 
producers to close, which could have the affect the supply to customers. The 
threat of substitutes is greatest when forest product prices are high. While each 
option could reduce the number of suppliers, it is unlikely that this would cause a 
significant price increase given the capacity that exists in other producing regions 
of the world. 
The results of the PEST analysis highlight five major dynamics that will 
likely continue to influence provincial forest policy and its tenure system, and the 
industry's timber supplies. These are as follows: 
• the uncertainty created by Aboriginal and treaty rights on provincial 
Crown lands, 
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• the uncertainty and added costs of a forest policy regime and 
tenure system that has evolved into one of Canada's most 
complex, 
• the ongoing threat of environmental market campaigns promoting 
boycotts of B.C.'s lumber products , 
• the constraints imposed by the current Softwood Lumber 
Agreement limiting the provincial governments ability to reform 
forest policies, and 
• the eventual timber shortages that will occur due to the recent 
Mountain Pine Beetle infestation . 
Faced with these challenges, and the industries declining 
competitiveness , the provincial government must determine how it can best 
utilize tenure reform as a means to positively affect the determinants of its 
regional competitive advantage. As demonstrated in the five forces analysis , the 
three tenure reform options do present opportunities to affect firm structure and 
rivalry as well as investment in innovation . Further investigation into the 
possible effects of tenure reform on these determinants, including demand 
conditions and related and supporting industries will be necessary to assist 
government with this challenge. 
Overall , the results of the environmental scan demonstrates that B.C 
forest products firms competing in the commodity markets facing a very difficult 
challenge in order to reverse their current decline in global competitiveness. In 
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addition, the provincial government also faces significant obstacles when 
considering its role in creating the environment necessary for the industry to 




As the competitiveness of the BC forest products industry continues 
to decline, there are growing concerns about the ability of the current tenure 
system to support a globally competitive forest industry. Given that the structure 
and performance of the BC forest products industry is closely linked to the tenure 
system, careful consideration must be given to the design of any new tenure 
system, to understand the potential impact that tenure reform may have on 
industry competitiveness. 
In this study, an analytical strategic approach was developed, to compare 
three tenure reform options and how they might impact the competitive position 
of the forest industry was developed. With this in mind, the report presented the 
following: 
• an overview of the history of tenure reform in BC, and a discussion 
of the current tenure systems and three tenure reform options 
available to the BC government, 
• a discussion about the relevant strategic literature including the 
five forces model, strategy, national advantage, environmental 
scanning, 
• a discussion of the macro-level environment factors influencing the 
industry and the current industry competitive position using the five 
forces model, 
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• an analysis of the affects of the three tenure reform options on the 
five forces currently shaping competition in the global forest 
products industry. 
The analysis demonstrates that tenure reform can affect the forces of 
competition and will affect the relative position of the BC forest products industry. 
While it was not the intent of this paper to make a definitive recommendation 
about which of the three tenure reform options might be more favourable , the 
analysis does suggest that privatization will influence competitor rivalry, increase 
barriers to entry, and reduce supplier power. This is achieved by providing 
higher security to timber supplies, providing greater flexibility in terms of 
responding to the cyclical nature of the business, reducing direct costs of timber 
supplies, and potentially providing the incentive for firms to innovate in key areas 
of the value chain. The relatively high capital costs associated with this option 
will likely force higher cost firms to close . 
The qualitative nature of this study provides for a range of interpretation 
about the possible effects of tenure reform on the industry's competitive position. 
Further research incorporating quantitative data about industry trends would be 
helpful. In addition, the study focused on the extreme view that the existing 
tenure system would be discarded and replaced with one of the three options. 
This approach is not realistic so further research considering the affects of 
retaining some features of the exiting system combined with each of the three 
options would be useful. And finally, further research is recommended to 
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analyze the possible affects of tenure reform on a firm's choice of competitive 
strategy. The dominant competitive strategy currently utilized is in the industry is 
cost leadership. Considering the effects of tenure reform on Porter's ( 1980) 
generic strategies would contribute to a better understanding of possible effects 
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